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ABSTRACT
When Congress amended the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1986, it
established three separate and distinct ways to establish requisite
knowledge. A person violates the FCA when they (1) have actual
knowledge, (2) act with deliberate ignorance of the truth, or (3) act in
reckless disregard of the truth. The three FCA knowledge standards
are differentiated not by ease of proof but by specific application.
Merely because deliberate ignorance is the least common standard
does not make it less important or harder to prove. This Article gathers
and evaluates the handful of Circuit Courts of Appeals cases that
specifically address deliberate ignorance and proposes a uniform and
proper standard to guide courts and practitioners on the proper
meaning and usage of deliberate ignorance.
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ARTICLE
PROVING A VIOLATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT THROUGH
DELIBERATE IGNORANCE
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ABSTRACT
When Congress amended the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1986, it
established three separate and distinct ways to establish requisite knowledge. A
person violates the FCA when they (1) have actual knowledge, (2) act with
deliberate ignorance of the truth, or (3) act in reckless disregard of the truth.
The three FCA knowledge standards are differentiated not by ease of proof but
by specific application. Merely because deliberate ignorance is the least
common standard does not make it less important or harder to prove. This
Article gathers and evaluates the handful of Circuit Courts of Appeals cases
that specifically address deliberate ignorance and proposes a uniform and
proper standard to guide courts and practitioners on the proper meaning and
usage of deliberate ignorance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA)1 is the government’s primary tool for
combatting fraud and recovering ill-gotten gains.2 To combat rising fraud,
†
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before the U.S. Supreme Court, and many law review articles on the FCA. The author
represents the whistleblower in United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Forest Lab’ys, LLC, 499 F.
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1
See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
2
Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The False Claims
Act is the government’s primary litigative tool for the recovery of losses sustained as the
result of fraud against the government.”).
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Congress overhauled the FCA in 1986.3 Congress set out to strengthen the
statute by broadening its reach. First, it made clear that the government need
not prove fraudulent intent.4 Second, it expanded the definition of
knowledge, which courts viewed as requiring “actual knowledge,”5 to include
“deliberate ignorance” and “reckless disregard” as two separate and distinct
ways of establishing knowledge.6 Thus, under the 1986 amendments, a
person has the requisite scienter or FCA knowledge if they (1) have actual
knowledge, (2) act with deliberate ignorance of the truth, or (3) act in reckless
disregard of the truth.7 Although the FCA and its legislative history make
clear that only one of the three forms of knowledge is required, deliberate
ignorance is often overlooked and underutilized. Moreover, a few circuit
courts have mistakenly stated that reckless disregard is the “loosest”
knowledge standard of the three,8 which only leads to confusion as to the true
meaning and application of deliberate ignorance. The three FCA knowledge
standards are differentiated not by ease of proof but by specific application.
The mere fact that deliberate ignorance is the least common standard does
not render it less important or harder to prove. Congress added deliberate
ignorance to capture special types of improper billings. The deliberate
ignorance standard imposes on those who do business with the government
a limited duty to inquire when red flags exist, and it renders them liable for
sticking their heads in the sand instead of making simple inquiries to
appreciate their true obligations.

3
Joel D. Hesch, Allowing Whistleblowers to Copy Company Documents to File Qui Tam
Complaints Under the False Claims Act When Reporting Medicare Fraud, 13 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 265, 270 (2019).
4
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (“require no proof of specific intent to defraud”).
5
CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 4:43.
(2022) (“Prior to 1986, the Act did not define the term ‘knowingly.’ A number of courts had
construed the Act to require that a plaintiff show that the defendant had ‘actual knowledge’
of the fraud, or a specific intent to defraud.”).
6
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
7
Id.
8
See United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1378
(D.C. Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Hixson v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 613 F.3d 1186, 1190
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Siewick, 214 F.3d at 1378); United States ex rel. Complin v. N.C.
Baptist Hosp., 818 F. App’x 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States ex rel. Purcell v.
MWI Corp. 807 F.3d 281, 288 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu
Inc., 9 F.4th 455, 468 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Purcell, 807 F.3d at 288).
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Section II of this Article states the history and purpose of the FCA. Section
III addresses areas in which the courts mistakenly treat deliberate ignorance
as a higher standard than reckless disregard as well as improperly borrow
definitions from criminal cases. Section III also gathers and evaluates United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals cases that specifically address deliberate
ignorance. Section IV proposes a uniform and proper standard to guide
courts and practitioners on the proper meaning and usage of deliberate
ignorance to establish a knowing violation of the FCA.
II. HISTORY AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act was first enacted in 1863 by President Abraham
Lincoln to combat widespread fraud “against the military during the Civil
War.”9 The FCA “sat largely dormant from 1943 to 1986” because its
provisions were “too strict.”10 In 1986, due to rising fraud, Congress
revitalized and modernized the FCA, which is now the government’s most
important tool to combat fraud.11
The FCA renders a person liable when they knowingly submit false claims
to the government.12 Prior to 1986, the statute did not define knowledge and
thus it generally required actual knowledge.13 The 1986 amendments not only
added a definition, but purposefully defined knowledge to include both
deliberate ignorance and reckless disregard. Today, the terms “knowing” and
“knowingly” are specifically defined to “mean that a person, with respect to
information—(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”14

9
Joel D. Hesch, Understanding the Revised Reverse False Claims Provision of the False
Claims Act and Why No Proof of A False Claim Is Required, 53 UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV. 461,
464 (2021) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5273); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (“The False Claims Act of 1863 was adopted during the Civil War in order to
combat fraud and price-gouging in war procurement contracts.”).
10
Hesch, supra note 3, at 270.
11 Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
12
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G). The seven subparts of liability cover a broad array
ranging from knowingly presenting to causing others to present false claims. The
distinctions are not relevant to this Article.
13
SYLVIA, supra note 5.
14
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
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Congress intentionally included the disjunctive “or” when drafting the
requirements of knowledge to create three distinct ways to establish
knowledge. First, a person may have acted with actual knowledge that they
were submitting a claim for funds that they were not entitled to.15 This is the
classic form of fraud whereby the person knew the claim was false. Second, a
person may have acted with deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information.16 This occurs when a person has a duty to inquire but elects to
bury their head in the sand to avoid knowing the claim is false. For instance,
a person might have made an initial inquiry with a government official
regarding a contract requirement but disliked the direction of the
conversation and elected to stop further communications to avoid learning
that they were not entitled to the funds. Third, a person may have acted with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the information.17 This addresses
a type of guilty knowledge different from burying one’s head in the sand. For
instance, a person might have unreasonably relied upon a regulation they
considered to be ambiguous. The Act considers reckless conduct to be
tantamount to knowledge.18

15
Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i); see also United States ex rel. Ervin & Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton
Sec. Grp., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 18, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2005); United States v. Speqtrum, Inc., 113
F. Supp. 3d 238, 249 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Actual knowledge looks at ‘subjective knowledge,’
while deliberate ignorance ‘seeks out the kind of willful blindness from which subjective
intent can be inferred.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 57 (D.D.C. 2007))). Reckless disregard, in contrast, is “an
extension of gross negligence . . . an extreme version of ordinary negligence” or “gross
negligence-plus.” United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942–43 (D.D.C. 1997); see also
United States ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 530 F.3d 980, 983 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d
272, 277 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd, 393 F.3d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“innocent mistakes [or]
negligence . . . are insufficient . . . ‘the claim must be a lie’” (quoting Hindo v. Univ. of Health
Sciences/The Chicago Med. Sch., 65 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1995))); Hamilton Sec. Grp., Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (“The standard of reckless disregard . . . address[es] the refusal to learn
of information which an individual, in the exercise of prudent judgment, should have
discovered.”).
16
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii).
17
Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii).
18
According to legislative history, “reckless disregard and gross negligence define
essentially the same conduct and . . . under this act, reckless disregard does not require any
proof of an intentional, deliberate, or willful act.” 132 Cong. Rec. S11238 (1986). The
Supreme Court also noted that if a reasonable person would understand that a requirement
was material, it amounts to reckless disregard, even if the government did not “spell [it] out.”
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 191 (2016).
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Deliberate ignorance was new to the 1986 amendments. Before 1986, the
FCA did not define knowledge or include either reckless disregard or
deliberate ignorance as ways of establishing knowledge.19 When modernizing
and strengthening the FCA, “the House Judiciary Committee noted the
problems from the lack of a definition of ‘knowledge’ and reported”:20
By adopting this [three-pronged] definition of knowledge,
the committee intends not only to cover those individuals
who file a claim with actual knowledge that the information
is false, but also to confer liability upon those individuals
who deliberately ignore or act in reckless disregard of the
falsity of the information contained in the claim. It is
intended that persons who ignore “red flags” that the
information may not be accurate or those persons who
deliberately choose to remain ignorant of the process through
which their company handles a claim should be held liable
under the Act. This definition, therefore, enables the
Government not only to effectively prosecute those persons
who have actual knowledge, but also those who play
“ostrich.”21
The Senate further addressed the need to define knowledge and to make it
clear that it is not limited to actual knowledge. With respect to adding
deliberate ignorance, “the Senate Committee also focused on proverbial
‘ostriches’ who stick their heads in the sand instead of verifying that they are
not cheating taxpayers.”22 According to the Senate Committee, “the
19

SYLVIA, supra note 5, § 4:45.
United States v. SuperValu Inc., 9 F.4th 455, 479 (7th Cir. 2021)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).
21
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting H. REP. NO. 99-660, at
21 (1986)).
22
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7, 15, 21 (1986)). The full language on these points by
the Senate read:
20

New subsection (c) of section 3729 clarifies the standard of intent for a
finding of liability under the act. This language establishes liability for
those ‘who know, or have reason to know’ that a claim is false. In order to
avoid varying interpretations, the Committee further defined the standard
as making liable those who have ‘actual knowledge that the claim is false,
fictitious, or fraudulent, or acts in gross negligence of the duty to make
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constructive knowledge definition attempts to reach what has become known
as the ‘ostrich’ type situation where an individual has ‘buried his head in the
sand’ and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert him that false
claims are being submitted.”23
The two leading authors of the amendments also described why Congress
such inquiry as would be reasonable and prudent to conduct under the
circumstances to ascertain the true and accurate basis of the claim.’ []
While it is clear that actual knowledge of a claim’s falsity will confer
liability, courts have split on defining what type of ‘constructive
knowledge’, if any, is rightfully culpable. In fashioning the appropriate
standard of knowledge for liability under the civil False Claims Act, S.
1562 adopts the concept that individuals and contractors receiving public
funds have some duty to make a limited inquiry so as to be reasonably
certain they are entitled to the money they seek. A rigid definition of that
‘duty’, however, would ignore the wide variance of circumstances under
which the Government funds its programs and the correlating variance in
sophistication of program recipients. Consequently, S. 1562 defines this
obligation as ‘to make such inquiry as would be reasonable and prudent
to conduct under the circumstances to ascertain the true and accurate
basis of the claim.’ Only those who act in ‘gross negligence’ of this duty
will be found liable under the False Claims Act.
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 20.
The Committee believes that the definition of knowledge under the False
Claims Act should not differ from the definition of knowledge for any
administrative adjudications regarding false claims. In both bills, the
constructive knowledge definition attempts to reach what has become
known as the ‘ostrich’ type situation where an individual has ‘buried his
head in the sand’ and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert
him that false claims are being submitted. While the Committee intends
that at least some inquiry be made, the inquiry need only be ‘reasonable
and prudent under the circumstances’, which clearly recognizes a limited
duty to inquire as opposed to a burdensome obligation. The phrase strikes
a balance which was accurately described by the Department of Justice as
‘designed to assure the skeptical both that mere negligence could not be
punished by an overzealous agency and that artful defense counsel could
not urge that the statute actually require some form of intent as an
essential ingredient of proof.’
Id. at 21.
23
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 21; see also SuperValu, 9 F.4th 455, 479 (Hamilton, J., dissenting)
(“These ostriches need not have ‘conscious culpability’ of wrongdoing: people who submit
claims that they have ‘reason to know’ are potentially false run the risk of violating the Act if
they ‘fail[] to inquire’ as to the falsity of the claims.” (alteration in original) (citing 132 CONG.
REC. 20535 (1986))).
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added deliberate ignorance. Senator Grassley “explained that the sponsors
had rejected a proposed ‘constructive knowledge’ standard because it could
be construed to absolve persons of a duty to ascertain the facts, which would
‘leave unaddressed the “ostrich” problem.’”24 Congressman Berman similarly
explained why the House included deliberate ignorance:
Federal Contractors, persons and entities doing business
with the government must be made to understand that they
have an affirmative obligation to ascertain the truthfulness
of the claims they submit. No longer will Federal contractors
be able to bury their heads in the sand to insulate themselves
from the knowledge a prudent person should have before
submitting a claim to the Government. Contractors who
ignore or fail to inquire about red flags that should alert
them to the fact that false claims are being submitted will be
liable for those false claims.25
In sum, in 1986, Congress added two new ways of establishing knowledge:
deliberate ignorance and reckless disregard. Congress specifically added
deliberate ignorance to ensure that those who receive government funds not
only understand that they have a limited duty to inquire but are liable under
the FCA for failing to do so. This is different from—and in addition to—
actual knowledge or reckless disregard.26
III. COURTS’ TREATMENT OF DELIBERATE IGNORANCE
Unfortunately, courts often lump reckless disregard and deliberate
ignorance together rather than define and evaluate their individual
requirements.27 Consequently, few cases have stated the test or standard for
deliberate ignorance. Improperly lumping the two standards together has
created an environment where courts use the same reasoning for dismissing
allegations of reckless disregard and deliberate ignorance. This section
evaluates why it is improper to lump the standards together and gathers cases
that correctly focus upon the meaning of deliberate ignorance.

24

SYLVIA, supra note 5, § 4:45 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 20535 (1986)).
Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 20535 (1986)).
26
Id. (“courts have construed the ‘reckless disregard’ standard to be a form of gross
negligence”) (gathering cases addressing reckless disregard).
27
Id. (“Although few courts have addressed the deliberate ignorance standard, a number
of courts have addressed ‘reckless disregard’ or considered both standards together.”).
25
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Reckless Disregard Is Not the Loosest Standard

Without analysis, four Circuit Courts of Appeals have stated that reckless
disregard is the loosest standard of knowledge under the FCA.28 The starting
point was a 2000 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case—United States ex rel.
Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.29 In Siewick, the plaintiff alleged that a
former employer violated a criminal statute aimed at “revolving door” abuses
by former government employees while working for the company
negotiating a government contract.30 The FCA case was predicated upon the
allegation that the invoices were false because the company did not comply
with the law pertaining to hiring government employees. The court of
appeals rejected a claim based upon implicit certifications because a mere
violation of law does not render all claims false.31
With respect to reliance upon express certifications, the court noted that
it turns in part on the FCA’s definition of “knowingly.”32 The court listed the
three FCA knowledge standards, but that is as far as it went to analyze them.33
The plaintiff argued that knowledge could be inferred because the defendant
knew the contract was voidable.34 The court devoted its full attention to
whether the contract was voidable.35 It observed that if an existing published
opinion by a panel of the Seventh Circuit could not itself determine if such a
contract was voidable (which the court in this case still left open), the

28

See United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1378
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (“it is hard to see how [the defendants] could . . . have satisfied even the
loosest standard of knowledge, i.e., acting ‘in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information.’”); United States ex rel. Hixson v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 613 F.3d 1186, 1190
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Siewick, 214 F.3d at 1378); United States ex rel. Complin v. N.C.
Baptist Hosp., 818 F. App’x 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2020) (“But ‘establishing even the loosest
standard of knowledge, i.e., acting in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information, is difficult when falsity turns on a disputed interpretive question.’”); SuperValu,
9 F.4th at 468 (“reckless disregard is the loosest standard of knowledge under the FCA’s
scienter requirement” (referring to language in United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.,
807 F.3d 281, 288 (D.C. Cir. 2015))).
29
Siewick, 214 F.3d at 1378.
30
Id. at 1374.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1376.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1376–78 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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defendant could not have had the knowledge the FCA required.36 The court
noted that “the obstacles to a conclusion that [the defendant] ‘knowingly’
misrepresented the validity of the contract obligations are legion.”37 It was
here that the court introduced the “loosest standard” language:
First, if the panel in Medico was uncertain whether a § 207
violation created voidability, it is hard to see how Jamieson
or O'Connor could—with respect even to voidability, let
alone validity—have satisfied even the loosest standard of
knowledge, i.e., acting “in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information.”38
Ironically, the Siewick court cited the disjunctively written FCA definition
of knowledge as its sole authority for the proposition that recklessness
somehow is the “loosest” of the three methods.39 In addition, the Siewick
court never defined or analyzed a single test, definition, or standard for either
reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance. Instead, the court focused on the
fact that falsity was premised upon a contingency that did not exist.40 Even if
the contract were voidable, only the government, not the whistleblower,
could exercise the right to void it. For the claims to be false, the government
would have to elect to void the contract, which it did not do.41 The
whistleblower’s problem was that he lacked authority to void government
contracts or to treat this contract as void.42 Because the contract was not void,
the defendant could not possess FCA knowledge of any kind because the

36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 1377–38.
Id. at 1378.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3)).
Id.
Id.
While a faulty estimate or opinion can qualify as a false statement where
the speaker knows facts “which would preclude such an opinion,” the
“facts” of which the Harrison court spoke are those that the speaking party
could reasonably classify as true or false. Here there is only legal
argumentation and possibility.

Id. (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 792 (4th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted)).
41
Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
42
Id.
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claims were not false.43 Thus, the court did not need to differentiate between
reckless disregard and deliberate ignorance. The court had no reason to state
that reckless disregard is the loosest standard. Again, the court never
discussed or analyzed the meaning of deliberate ignorance. As such, the oft
quoted passage has no legs to stand on. At most, the court in Siewick held
that there was no proof that the contract was void—a necessary ingredient
for the claims to be false.44 Because the contract was not void, there was no
false claim and the defendant’s knowledge was irrelevant.45 Accordingly, the
Siewick court had no reason to even state that reckless disregard was the
loosest form of knowledge. It certainly did not analyze the standards for
either reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance.46
The other circuit cases were erroneous because the court merely relied
upon Siewick (or cases citing to it) without any analysis.47 Just because one
case, Siewick, states in dicta that reckless disregard is the “loosest” of the three
standards does not make it true. It defies logic to categorize one of three
different types as the “loosest” or easiest to prove such that its absence bars
even an attempt to prove another. A “loosest” premise would be true if the
issue centered around the burden of proof. It would be true that
preponderance of the evidence is a looser standard than beyond a reasonable
doubt, such that if you cannot meet the preponderance of evidence standard,
as a matter of law, you cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt. But it is
illogical to suggest, let alone rule as a matter of law, that if a plaintiff cannot
prove that the defendant acted with reckless disregard, it cannot not prove
that the defendant acted with deliberate ignorance. Indeed, each of the three
methods of proving FCA knowledge apply to different types of fact patterns.
It is therefore a mistake to label one looser or easier to prove. While it may
be harder in some factual settings to prove that a person had actual
knowledge that a claim they submitted did not meet government standards,
it does not mean that it is always harder to prove or that it forecloses

43

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
Siewick, 214 F.3d at 1378.
45
See id.
46
Siewick, 214 F.3d 1372.
47
United States ex rel. Hixson v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 613 F.3d 1186, 1190 (8th Cir.
2010); United States ex rel. Complin v. N.C. Baptist Hosp., 818 F. App’x 179, 184 (4th Cir.
2020) (citing United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 807 F.3d 281, 288 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
which simply relied upon Siewick); United States v. SuperValu Inc., 9 F.4th 455, 468 (7th Cir.
2021) (citing Purcell, 807 F.3d at 288).
44
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deliberate ignorance.
Moreover, it does not mean plaintiffs can never prove actual knowledge if
they cannot prove deliberate ignorance. For instance, consider the factual
setting in 1863 that prompted the enactment of the original FCA.48 The
military received sand instead of sugar.49 When the defendant gave the
military sand, the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the claim
for payment for supplying sugar. The defendant knew it was substituting
sand instead of sugar to cheat the government. However, it does not follow
that it would be easier for the government to prove reckless disregard than
actual knowledge. Here, only actual knowledge would be available as a way
of establishing knowledge. Because the contract was clear and unambiguous,
there was no evidence available to prove reckless disregard, such as
reasonable reliance upon an ambiguous regulation. Thus, if reckless
disregard, as the purported “loosest standard,” is a gateway barring the other
two forms of the FCA knowledge standard, then the person intending to
supply sand instead of sugar would escape FCA liability because the contract
and any associated regulations were crystal clear that sugar was required.
There are many factual settings in which more than one of the three
standards might apply, and it would be wrong to limit FCA knowledge to
reckless disregard. Take another example. Assume a company wins a military
contract to build an airplane, but the military later issues regulations
requiring companies to heat treat certain airplane parts to harden and
increase metal strength. Further assume that the company does not perform
the required heat treatment. In that setting, the company might be liable
under each of the three knowledge standards depending upon why it did not
heat treat the parts as required. If the company knew about the heat treatment
requirement but wanted to save costs by choosing not to do it, it might be
liable for having actual knowledge. If it read the regulations but considered
them ambiguous and inapplicable, it might be liable under reckless disregard.
If it heard that there were new regulations that might apply but chose not to
read them, it could be liable under deliberate ignorance. Similarly, if the
company reached out to the contracting officer to ask a question about the
regulations but did not like the direction the conversation was going and
chose to stop further inquiries, it might be liable under deliberate ignorance.

48
Joel D. Hesch, Restating the “Original Source Exception” to the False Claims Act’s
“Public Disclosure Bar” in Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 991, 995 (2017).
49
Id.
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Another fatal flaw of the “loosest standard” interpretation is its rejection
of subjective bad faith as a way of establishing a defendant’s knowledge.50 By
adopting an objective scienter—reckless disregard—as the scienter “floor,” it
makes subjective intent entirely irrelevant.51 Such an interpretation is
inconsistent with the nature of fraud and the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the FCA. The Supreme Court has interpreted the FCA consistently with
common law fraud,52 which makes subjective bad faith central to fraudulent
scienter.53 Thus, a person could be held liable under the FCA if they “knew”
or “believed” their claim was false or if they “did not have the confidence in
the accuracy” of their claim.54 Indeed, deliberate ignorance was included in
the 1986 amendment to capture this form of subjective bad faith.55
In short, it is unjustified for any court to hold, as a matter of law, that
reckless disregard is the loosest form of knowledge or that if it cannot be met,
the court need not examine deliberate ignorance. Deliberate ignorance can
exist in factual settings where reckless disregard is not available. The house
of cards collapses for the “loosest standard” language initiated by Siewick
because none of these courts engaged in a learned focus or conducted a
detailed analysis of the standard for deliberate ignorance. In fact, none of
these courts contrasted the standard for reckless disregard. For later courts
to simply adopt and build a house of cards on the loose language from Siewick
is inappropriate.
B.
Criminal Law’s Definition of Deliberate Ignorance Does Not Apply to
the FCA
Some courts have also mistakenly borrowed the test for willful blindness
from criminal cases and applied it to the meaning of deliberate ignorance
under the FCA, which helps explain why some courts incorrectly assume
deliberate ignorance has a higher culpability requirement than reckless

50
United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 9 F.4th 455, 473 (7th Cir. 2021)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 477.
53
Id. at 478.
54
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
55
Id. at 479 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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disregard.56 For instance, in 2016, a judge from the Eastern District of
Virginia in United States ex rel. Orgnon v. Chang adopted the test from a
Supreme Court case addressing willful blindness normally reserved for
criminal cases, but the Court applied it to a civil patent infringement case.57
The Chang court quoted language from the Supreme Court in Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. as justification to adopt a two-part test from
criminal cases to evaluate deliberate ignorance under the civil FCA.58
However tempting it might be to borrow the definition of deliberate
ignorance from criminal cases, or even willful blindness from Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc., that is not what Congress had in mind in 1986 when it set
out to both lower the standard of knowledge and eliminate any need to prove
intent by adding deliberate ignorance and reckless disregard as alternatives
to proving actual knowledge.
In Global-Tech Appliances, the Supreme Court explained the decades-long
criminal standard as follows:
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in
criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a
defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying
the doctrine have held that defendants cannot escape the
reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly
suggested by the circumstances. The traditional rationale for
the doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner
are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge. This

56
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Orgnon v. Chang, No. 3:13-CV-144-JAG, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20613, at *8–10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 19, 2016); Siebert v. Gene Sec. Network, Inc, 75 F.
Supp. 3d 1108, 1116–17 (N.D. Cal. 2014); United States ex rel. Saltzman v. Textron Sys.
Corp., No. CIV.A. 09-11985-RGS, 2011 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 61994, at *12, n.8 (D. Mass. June 9,
2011).
57
United States ex rel. Orgnon v. Chang, No. 3:13-CV-144-JAG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20613, at *9–10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 19, 2016).
58
Chang, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20613, at *10 (“[T]he doctrine of ‘willful blindness’ has two
basic requirements: ‘(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid
learning of that fact.’” (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060,
2070 (2011)); accord Siebert v. Gene Sec. Network, Inc, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1116–17 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (“In other contexts, the Ninth Circuit has defined deliberate ignorance to
incorporate two components: (1) a subjective belief in a high probability that a fact exists,
and (2) deliberate actions taken to avoid learning the truth.” (citation omitted)).

(D. Md. 2020), aff’d sub nom. United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales,
LLC, No. 20-2330, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 27437 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 2022).
*
Mr. Hesch extends a special note of thanks to his research assistant, Brent
Dugwyler, J.D. 2024, who provided valuable assistance in drafting this article.
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Court endorsed a concept similar to willful blindness over a
century ago in Spurr v. United States, and every Federal
Court of Appeals but one has fully embraced willful
blindness.59
The Court broke new ground by applying the criminal standard for willful
blindness to civil patent infringement allegations,60 but it did so only after it
determined that the infringement cause of action contained an “intent”
element and thus was similar to requirements in criminal cases.61
The test for willful blindness from criminal cases or civil cases with intent
elements do not apply to the civil FCA. First, unlike criminal statutes or the
intent-based patent infringement statute in Global-Tech Appliances, the civil
FCA has no intent requirement.62 The FCA specifically states that “the terms
‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’ . . . require no proof of specific intent to
defraud.”63
Second, in 1986, Congress specifically amended the FCA knowledge
requirement to lower or lessen the standard of proof by adding deliberate
ignorance and reckless disregard as separate and independent bases for
establishing knowledge. The deliberate ignorance standard was intended to
be different from and lighter than the pre-existing actual knowledge
requirement.64 Thus, Congress lowered the standard by adding deliberate
ignorance (and reckless disregard) to capture all forms of knowledge above
innocent mistakes or mere negligence.65
Third, nowhere in the legislative history does Congress cite to any criminal
case or intent-based statutes as a basis for defining or equating deliberate
ignorance.66 Rather, the legislative history makes clear that deliberate

59
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 755–56 (2011) (citation
omitted).
60
Id. at 768 (“Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the
Federal Judiciary, [there is] no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for
induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”).
61
Id. at 760. (“Although the text of § 271(b) makes no mention of intent, we infer that at
least some intent is required.”).
62
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
63
Id.
64
See SYLVIA, supra note 5. Prior to 1986, the knowledge requirement was not defined
and was equated with actual knowledge. Id.
65
See discussion of legislative history, supra notes 21–26.
66
See discussion of legislative history, supra notes 21–26.
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ignorance as used in the FCA is designed to hold accountable the proverbial
ostriches who stick their heads in the sand.67 It also imposes a limited duty to
make simple inquiries that would alert a person that their claims for payment
are false.68
In sum, it is not proper to adopt definitions or standards from criminal
cases or intent-based statutes to determine the meaning of deliberate
ignorance under the FCA. Indeed, doctrines developed from criminal cases
are based upon the rationale “that defendants who behave in this manner are
just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”69 In other words, the
terms “deliberate ignorance” and “willful blindness” in criminal or intentbased statutes are proxies for intent. As such, they are neither controlling nor
instructive because the civil FCA is not an intent-based statute, and Congress
meant deliberate ignorance to be something less than actual knowledge.
C.

Court of Appeals Cases Addressing Deliberate Ignorance

This section gathers and analyzes four Circuit Courts of Appeals cases that
directly address and apply the deliberate ignorance standard. Two of the
cases held that the deliberate ignorance standard was met and two held that
it was not met.
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. United
Healthcare Insurance Company, conducted a detailed analysis of deliberate
ignorance.70 The case is instructive because the court not only evaluated the
legislative history but also created a separate standard for deliberate
ignorance rather than lumping it in with reckless disregard.71 In United
Healthcare Insurance Company, the plaintiff alleged FCA knowledge based
upon deliberate ignorance when a group of Medicare Advantage
organizations allegedly submitted false certifications by exaggerating
enrollees’ health risks.72 The Ninth Circuit adopted the following standard
for deliberate ignorance:
As we have explained in describing this standard under the

67

See discussion of legislative history, supra notes 21–26.
See discussion of legislative history, supra notes 21–26.
69
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
70
See United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1176–77 (9th Cir.
2016).
71
See id. at 1174, 1179.
72
Id. at 1166.
68
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False Claims Act:
In defining knowingly, Congress attempted “to reach
what has become known as the ‘ostrich’ type situation where
an individual has ‘buried his head in the sand’ and failed to
make simple inquiries which would alert him that false
claims are being submitted.” Congress adopted “the concept
that individuals and contractors receiving public funds have
some duty to make a limited inquiry so as to be reasonably
certain they are entitled to the money they seek. While the
Committee intends that at least some inquiry be made, the
inquiry need only be ‘reasonable and prudent under the
circumstances.’”73
In United Healthcare Insurance Company, the government alleged the
defendant designed review procedures to find errors in prior billings that
under-reported costs billed through diagnostic codes but not those that overreported costs.74 At the time that it certified its bills, the company reasonably
believed it was billing proper codes. However, the defendant orchestrated
cherry-picking of data that would increase the amount of billings that the
defendant might not have to pay back.75 Because the system did not flag
specific over-reporting errors, the company disclaimed any actual knowledge
that its prior claims were inflated.76 The Ninth Circuit held that the deliberate
ignorance standard was adequately plead by the government’s complaint.77
The court reasoned that “[t]he deliberate ignorance standard does not allow
a contractor to deliberately turn a blind eye to reporting errors and then attest
that, to its knowledge, they do not exist.”78 The court observed that, under
the facts alleged, deliberate ignorance would be met because once the
73

Id. at 1174 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1168
(9th Cir. 2008)). The Bourseau court held that deliberate ignorance was met where nonexistent expenses were included in cost reports submitted to the government, such as rental
expenses that never existed. Bourseau, 531 F.3d at 1168. The president was equally
deliberately ignorant because “[h]e undertook no inquiry into the cost reports, let alone a
reasonable and prudent one. His behavior falls within the category of deliberate
ignorance.” Id.
74
United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1170.
75
Id. at 1171.
76
Id. at 1176.
77
Id. at 1176.
78
Id. at 1178.
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company created its program to examine prior billings and learned that its
data included a significant number of erroneously reported diagnostic codes,
red flags existed indicating that the errors could either increase or decrease
the amount of payments.79 The government alleged the company simply
chose to turn a blind eye to those that decreased payments.80
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit similarly found that allegations are sufficient
under the deliberate ignorance standard when a defendant has notice of its
false claims and actively attempts to conceal their disclosure.81 The court
restated the standard as follows:
The deliberate ignorance standard can cover “the ostrich
type situation where an individual has buried his head in the
sand and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert
him that false claims are being submitted. Congress adopted
the concept that individuals and contractors receiving public
funds have some duty to make a limited inquiry so as to be
reasonably certain they are entitled to the money they
seek.”82
In Godecke ex rel. United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., a medical equipment
manufacturer allegedly submitted false claims to Medicare by failing to notify
Medicare that the manufacturer did not meet Medicare’s requirements for
reimbursement.83 Medicare requires that the manufacturer obtain a detailed
written order from a physician before the manufacturer delivers medical
equipment to Medicare patients.84 If that requirement is not met, Medicare
will not reimburse the manufacturer for the equipment.85 The manufacturer
in Godecke allegedly submitted claims to Medicare for reimbursement even
though it delivered the equipment before receiving the physician’s order.86
The Godecke court found sufficient facts to allege deliberate ignorance for
two reasons: because the manufacturer allegedly set up a tracking system to
79

Id. at 1175.
United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
81
Godecke ex rel. United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1211–12 (9th Cir.
2019).
82
Id. at 1211(citations omitted) (quoting United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1174).
83
Id. at 1206–07.
84
Id. at 1206.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1206–07.
80
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hide that the manufacturer delivered the equipment before it received the
physician’s order and because management instructed an employee not to
appeal Medicare’s denial of claims for fear that Medicare would notice the
lack of a prior order.87 The court also observed that the company fired an
employee shortly after the employee raised issues about the billings.88 The
court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the scienter requirement—at
least under the deliberate ignorance standard—based on the tracking system,
the instruction not to appeal Medicare denials, and the quick termination of
the employees who raised concerns about false claims being submitted.89 The
court reasoned that “at the very least, [the evidence] [was] sufficient to show
the ‘ostrich type situation’ of deliberate ignorance on the part of [the
manufacturer], where [the manufacturer] has ‘buried his head in the sand
and failed to make simple inquiries which would alert [it] that false claims
are being submitted.’”90
At least two circuit courts have found deliberate ignorance to be lacking.
In its 2020 unpublished decision in Vassallo v. Rural/Metro Operating Co.,
the Ninth Circuit held that deliberate ignorance was not met simply due to
negligence.91 An ambulance transport service company allegedly submitted
false claims to Medicare because of its faulty coding system.92 The company
hired inexperienced coders, had glitchy software, and had imperfect training

87
Godecke ex rel. United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F. 3d 1201, 1211–12 (9th
Cir. 2019).
88
Id. at 1208.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1212 (fifth alteration in original) (quoting United States v. United Healthcare Ins.
Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1174 (9th Cir. 2016)). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit also
summarily affirmed a finding of deliberate ignorance in light of “undisputed evidence that
[the defendant] ignored expert advice about handling grant funds . . . .” United States ex rel.
Kozak v. Chabad of Cal., 697 F. App’x 509, 509 (9th Cir. 2017). A few district court cases are
also illustrative. Courts have found sufficient facts to allege deliberate ignorance when a
company knew it lacked the resources and the manpower to deliver, when a board simply
rubber-stamped exorbitant spending by officers without making any inquiries, and when a
defendant failed to review coding practices in the face of the high failure results of audits and
chart reviews by Medicare auditors. United States v. Armet Armored Vehicles, Inc., No.
4:12-cv-00045, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171925, at *4–6 (W.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2014); United
States ex rel. Wuestenhoefer v. Jefferson, 105 F. Supp. 3d 641, 668 (N.D. Miss. 2015); United
States ex rel. Ormsby v. Sutter Health, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1040, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
91
Vassallo v. Rural/Metro Operating Co., 798 F. App’x 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
92
Vasallo v. Rural/Metro Corp., No. CV-15-00119-PHX-SRB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
237615, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2019)
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practices.93 This resulted in inaccurate claims to Medicare.94 The circuit court
held that the company’s conduct did not meet the FCA’s deliberate ignorance
standard.95 The court reasoned that, by itself, “‘inexperienced coders, glitchy
billing software, imperfect training practices, and even post-transition billing
and coding errors’ [did] not demonstrate that [the] [d]efendants sought to
avoid learning about coding issues.”96 Thus, the court affirmed the grant of
summary judgment.97
In 2002, the Eighth Circuit in United States ex rel. Quirk v. Madonna
Towers, Inc., ruled that merely failing to seek legal advice does not rise to the
level of deliberate ignorance.98 There, the dispute centered around whether
the Medicare provider should have billed at the lower residential fee or the
higher skilled nursing facility fee.99 The whistleblower alleged that the
provider acted with deliberate ignorance because it did not seek a legal
opinion to resolve the questions.100 The court began its analysis by stating that
“innocent mistakes and negligence are not offenses under the Act.”101 The
court opined that in some cases failing to obtain a legal opinion might
constitute deliberate ignorance if red flags warranted it.102 However, neither
facility employee in question “had any reason to pursue a legal opinion
concerning the billing practices because both of them considered the practice
acceptable standard procedure.”103 One of the employees testified that his
prior employer also billed in the same manner.104 Thus, there was no
“evidence suggesting that anyone at [the facility] suspected something wrong
93

Vassallo, 798 F. App’x at 1001.
Vasallo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237615, at *5; see also Vassallo, 798 F. App’x at 1001.
95
Vassallo, 798 F. App’x at 1001.
96
Id. The court added, “Nor does this evidence make out a case of reckless disregard – as
the district court found, it ‘does little more than second-guess the wisdom’ of Rural/Metro’s
compliance efforts. At best, Relators made out a case of negligence, which is insufficient for
FCA purposes.” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th
Cir. 2014)).
97
Id.
98
United States ex rel. Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc., 278 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2002).
99
Id. at 767.
100
See id.
101
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 457, 464–65 (9th Cir.
1999)).
102
See Madonna Towers, 278 F.3d at 768.
103
Id.
104
Id.
94
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but deliberately avoided learning more so that a fraudulent scheme could
continue.”105 Accordingly, “failing to secure a legal opinion, without more, is
not the type of deliberate ignorance that can form the basis for a FCA
lawsuit.”106
These decisions share a common thread: liability will be imposed under
the deliberate ignorance standard when a defendant has notice of the
potential falsity of their claim and fails to take reasonable steps to investigate
the matter.
IV. THE CORRECT APPROACH TO THE FCA’S DELIBERATE
IGNORANCE
This section proposes a uniform standard to guide courts and
practitioners on the proper meaning and usage of deliberate ignorance to
establish a knowing violation of the FCA.107
A.

The False Claims Act

When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it created three distinct ways
to establish knowledge: actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, and reckless
disregard.108 These knowledge standards are not differentiated by ease of
proof but by specific application. Deliberate ignorance does not have a higher
standard of proof than reckless disregard or actual knowledge.109 In addition,
deliberate ignorance was not meant to be a proxy for actual knowledge but a
separate way of proving knowledge as defined by the FCA. Merely because
deliberate ignorance is less common does not make it less important.
Congress added it to capture special types of knowledge of false claims.
105

Id. at 769.
Id. A district court similarly ruled that deliberate ignorance was lacking where a
government contractor misclassified certain costs and the contractor did not seek legal
advice. United States ex rel. Tate v. Honeywell, Inc., No. CIV 96-0098 PK/LFG, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30099, at *9–10 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2002). The whistleblower alleged that the
contractor falsely classified a project as a major subcontractor. Id. at *3. The court held that
deliberate ignorance was not met because it amounted to a legitimate dispute over the proper
classification within the parameters of the applicable cost accounting standards and
practices, and the company did not hide the classification or data. See id. at *9–10. There
were no red flags warranting seeking legal advice. See id.
107
The proposed standard builds upon and is consistent with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases cited in this Article.
108
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
109
Reckless disregard is not the loosest form of knowledge. It is simply a different way of
establishing knowledge. See discussion supra Section III.A.
106
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Proposed Standards for Deliberate Ignorance

A person acts with deliberate ignorance when they have reason to suspect
their claim is false and fail to inquire as to the claim’s truthfulness or falsity.110
Put another way, a person cannot escape FCA liability by deliberately
avoiding learning the requirements of the law. Such deliberate ignorance is
generally found in two forms: burying one’s head in the sand and turning a
blind eye.
1. Burying One’s Head in the Sand
Deliberate ignorance reaches the “‘ostrich’ type situation where an
individual has ‘buried his head in the sand’ and failed to make simple
inquiries which would alert him that false claims are being submitted.”111
Deliberate ignorance captures persons who ignore red flags that warn them
that the information or claim submitted to the government may be false.112
Once a red flag is raised, a duty to investigate exists, although “the inquiry
need only be ‘reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.’”113
Deliberate ignorance occurs when people bury their heads in the sand to
avoid learning information that might lead them to know their claim is false
or that they are not entitled to the funds.114 Deliberate ignorance attaches
when a person seeks to remain ignorant. It may involve taking steps to avoid
learning information or instructing others not to ask questions. Burying
one’s head in the sand also includes failing to become familiar with contract
terms or regulations.115 Those who do business with the government have an
affirmative duty to ascertain the truthfulness of their claims.116 Persons
submitting claims to the government cannot insulate themselves from FCA

110

See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 20 (1986); United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 9
F.4th 455, 479 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
111
United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1174 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Bouresau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008)).
112
See id.
113
Id. (quoting United States v. Bouresau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008)).
114
Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F3d at 1174).
115
E.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 191 (2016) (stating
that if a reasonable person would understand that a requirement was material it amounts to
reckless disregard even if the government did not spell it out); United Healthcare Ins. Co.,
848 F.3d at 1174.
116
See United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1174.
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liability merely by choosing not to become knowledgeable.117 Persons who
choose to remain in the dark are liable under deliberate ignorance for false
claims.118
The notion of burying one’s head in the sand also includes those who make
an initial inquiry with the government but fail to follow up to avoid learning
the law’s requirements. This occurs when a person seeks the government’s
guidance on the law but then terminates the conversation after realizing they
do not like where the conversation is headed. They would rather remain
ignorant. When people raise an issue with the government, they must see it
through. Failing to do so shows a deliberate attempt to remain ignorant.
2. Turning a Blind Eye
Deliberate ignorance also applies when a person turns a blind eye to
known issues or potential problems.119 Those submitting claims have an
obligation to take steps to ensure their data or claims are accurate, complete,
and truthful.120 For example, a person might know that there are errors in the
data, but rather than investigate the issue, they choose to turn a blind eye.121
The standard applies when supervisors pressure employees to bill higher
codes or instruct them to focus on revenue instead of compliance.122 Another
example is ignoring bad information or cherry-picking information.123 Red
flags exist when employees or outside consultants raise issues or concerns
that trigger a limited duty to conduct a reasonable investigation.124 However,
deliberate ignorance does not apply to innocent mistakes or mere negligence.
For instance, hiring “inexperienced coders,” using “glitchy” software, or

117

Id.
Id.
119
See United States ex rel. Schmuckley v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 2:12-CV-01699-KJM-EFB,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67800, at *3, *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021); see also United Healthcare
Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1174.
120
United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1174 (“Medicare Advantage organizations have
always had ‘an obligation to take steps to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and
truthfulness of the encounter data’ and ‘an obligation to undertake “due diligence” to ensure
the accuracy, completeness, and truthfulness of encounter data submitted to [CMS].’”
(alteration in original)).
121
See id.
122
See United States ex rel. Ormsby v. Sutter Health, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1083 (N.D.
Cal. 2020).
123
See United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1171.
124
Id. at 1176.
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using “imperfect training practices” are typically not enough to show
deliberate ignorance.125 The key is whether the person turns a blind eye to
what would inform a reasonable person that their claim may be false.
Regardless of whether it is labeled burying one’s head in the sand or
turning a blind eye, deliberate ignorance frequently occurs when a red flag
exists and a simple inquiry would resolve the question.126 Once a red flag is
present that would alert a reasonable person that the claim may be false, a
duty to investigate exists. Deliberate ignorance captures those who fail to
make reasonable inquires in response to red flags.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it established three separate
and distinct ways to establish knowledge: actual knowledge, deliberate
ignorance, and reckless disregard. They are not differentiated by ease of proof
but by specific application. The three standards “may overlap” in some cases,
but the adoption of “the three distinct” standards “was unmistakably an effort
to be both thorough and broad.”127 Accordingly, the current trend of treating
reckless disregard as the “loosest standard” is misguided, unsupported by the
legislature’s intent,128 and should not be heeded by future courts. Such an
approach “also violates one of the most common tools of statutory
interpretation”—it makes the actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance
standards “utterly superfluous.”129 Instead, courts should assess each of the
three FCA knowledge standards (actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance,
and reckless disregard) as separate and distinct standards that apply to
different factual settings.
Deliberate ignorance applies to those who “ignore ‘red flags’ . . . or
deliberately choose to remain ignorant.”130 That is, people cannot simply bury
their heads in the sand or turn a blind eye to avoid learning the law’s
requirements. It is this unique type of conduct that Congress intended to
capture when it amended the FCA in 1986 to include deliberate ignorance.131
125

Vassallo v. Rural/Metro Operating Co., 798 F. App’x 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1174.
127
United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 9 F.4th 455, 484 (7th Cir. 2021)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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See H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 21 (1986).
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SuperValu, 9 F.4th at 484 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, this sort of fraudulent conduct would likely not satisfy either the
actual knowledge or reckless disregard prongs of the FCA.
Thus, to adhere to the statutory text and the legislature’s clear intent,
courts should treat the FCA’s three knowledge standards as separate and
distinct ways of establishing knowledge. In so doing, the FCA can be utilized
to capture each of the broad forms of fraud it was intended to address,
including deliberate ignorance.

